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Abstract
Will 1999 be an annus horribilis (‘horrible year‘) for the United Nations? Some tend to believe
the answer is yes. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s important yet controversial speech awhile
ago is a timely warning. Criticism of U.N. inaction, inefficiency, and indolence in the case of
Kosovo, and, to a certain extent, and even more surprisingly, in East Timor is widespread. The
fact that the organization may only act, however, when the U.N. Member States agree is often
overlooked. This Essay explores the U.S. attitude toward the U.N., institutional imbalances within
the U.N., and possible solutions to problems that arise from the one member veto.
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INTRODUCTION
Will 1999 be an annus horribilis ("horrible year") for the
United Nations? Some tend to believe the answer is yes. U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan's important yet controversial
speech a while ago is a timely warning. Criticism of U.N. inac-
tion, inefficiency, and indolence in the case of Kosovo,' and, to a
certain extent, and even more surprisingly, in East Timor is
widespread. The fact that the organization may only act, how-
ever, when the U.N. Member States agree is often overlooked.
The Secretary General opened a Pandora's Box by address-
ing the issue of humanitarian intervention, an issue that caused
gridlock in the United Nations last year and infuriated a large
segment of the world's public opinion. In his speech, Mr. An-
nan focused the spotlight on the conflict between the principles
of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention; a disturbing and
yet unavoidable dilemma. Mr. Annan's remarks created turmoil
in the U.N. General Assembly, forcing numerous Heads of State
and Foreign Ministers to -change-in haste-their prepared
statements in order to show their support or, more often, their
disapproval or mistrust of what was perceived as an all-out attack
on the sacred right of sovereignty.
The piercing dilemma presented by Mr. Annan was hatched
* Spanish Ambassador to the United Nations.
1. The United Nations was lambasted from different angles. Many complained
that the organization failed to stop the tragedy in Kosovo, while others, speaking from a
different political position, were unhappy that the United Nations let the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization ("NATO") act unilaterally. Among the latter was Spain's best
selling novelist Manuel Vfsquez Montalbdn, who sarcastically noted that after Yugosla-
via was knocked out in the bombing campaign, "the U.N. came out of its hiding place
and gave its OK to everything, absolutely everything that happened. It even approved its
own non-performance in this mess." La Onu M. Vazquez Montalhan, EL PAIs, June 14,
1999, at 88.
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in the spring of last year. The ides of spring were not auspicious
for the United Nations or the objectives for which it was created.
The crisis in Kosovo dangerously undermined the organization,
which was founded in 1945 to preserve world peace and security.
The statements by the Secretary General during April2 and
May3 of last year clearly demonstrated the tortured and painful
ambivalence of the defenders of the U.N. system and philoso-
phy. On the one hand, they criticized the ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, and denounced the excesses of the Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic as morally repugnant. They came to the
conclusion, explicitly stated or not, that some kind of military
action was all but unavoidable. On the other hand, they were
noticeably uncomfortable-from a legal standpoint-with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") intervention,
which was engineered outside the realm of the United Nations,
and thus in violation of the rules of the U.N. Charter.4 Angered
and overwhelmed by the relentless violations of human rights in
Kosovo, Mr. Annan showed his understanding and, without
much fanfare, straightforwardly accepted and implicitly justified
the operation against Milosevic. At a later stage and in a diplo-
matic fashion, he, however, pointed out the dangers of using
force without the express authorization of the one body in the
U.N. system that has a monopoly in this area, the U.N. Security
Council.
The best example of the Secretary General's first state of
mind, as described above, can be found in his 'statement in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, in April 1999. 5 The speech was a milestone
for the proponents of humanitarian intervention as a facet of
international law; his remarks were symptomatic and emphatic
enough. Rarely would a figure as important as the Secretary
General of the United Nations so candidly state that the sover-
2. See U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address Before the Commission on
Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland (Apr. 8, 1999), available in 1999 WL 15758163, at
*1 [hereinafter Geneva Address].
3. See U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the International
Rule of Law in Maintaining International Peace and Security, Address Before the
Centennial of the First International Peace Conference in The Hague, (May 18, 1999),
reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6997 (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter Hague Ad-
dress].
4. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter U.N.
Charter].
5. Geneva Address, supra note 2.
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eignty of a state is not absolute.6
He began with what is for him an article of faith. "[T] he
promotion and defense of human rights is at the heart of every
aspect of our work and every article of our Charter, '7 adding
that
when civilians are attacked and massacred because of their
ethnicity, as in Kosovo, the world looks to the United Nations
to speak up for them .... If, in the face of such abuses, we do
not speak up and speak out, if we do not act in defense of
human rights and advocate their lasting universality, how can
we answer to that global constituency? ... We will not, and
we cannot accept a situation where people are brutalized
within national boundaries... a United Nations that will not
stand up for human rights is a United Nations that cannot
stand up for itself.'
Noting that a failure to act in Kosovo would result in a humanita-
rian disaster throughout the entire region, Mr. Annan closed by
defending the right to intervene. "Emerging slowly, but I believe
surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of
minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of
State sovereignty."9 The conclusion was devastating. "No gov-
ernment has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in or-
der to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its
people."10
Mr. Annan followed a somewhat different line of thought,
or at least one with a different emphasis, one month later in The
Hague.11 It is not that Mr. Annan criticized the intervention in
Kosovo, but the tone and the spirit of his words were more true
to classic doctrine. The effectiveness and relevance of the Secur-
ity Council, according to Mr. Annan, must be the cornerstone
for the promotion of international peace and security in the
next century. More explicitly, the Secretary General stated that
"unless the Security Council is restored to its preeminent posi-
tion as the sole source of the legitimacy on the use of force, we
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *1-2.
9. Id. at *4-5.
10. Id. at *5.
11. Hague Address, supra note 3.
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are on a dangerous path to anarchy." 12
The change in emphasis by the Secretary General did not
go unnoticed in the United States, 3 and one of Mr. Annan's
aides felt compelled to declare that his boss was not attacking
anyone. The aide stated that Mr. Annan was merely expressing
"concern about a growing trend-the bypassing of the Security
Council-which he wants member states to think about. 1 4
Is Kofi Annan an opportunist who, depending on the audi-
ence or the occasion, preaches the revolutionary doctrine of
holy intervention when human rights are trampled, then sticks
to the dogma of classic international law by upholding the intan-
gible sovereignty of States? Certainly not. The Secretary Gen-
eral worries about the ethical imperative of preventing an enor-
mous outrage from going unpunished out of respect for the sov-
ereignty of a state, and the legal imperative of upholding the
U.N. Charter granted to the international community over half a
century ago to oversee relations among states. Mr. Annan's sup-
porters acknowledge that both statements complement each
other. The intervention in Kosovo was unavoidable, but it
should have been conducted through the U.N. system.
The crisis in East Timor led to another landslide of criticism
leveled at the United Nations and its perceived indolence. The
"militia" committed countless human rights violations, and again
the United Nations was thrashed. Eventually the Security Coun-
cil reached an agreement with Indonesia, but this was the sec-
ond striking and visible instance of human rights violations last
year. The world had seen enough, and so had the Secretary
General. 1
Mr. Annan reverted once again to the principle of humani-
tarian intervention at the opening of the General Assembly in
September.16 He defended this principle, somewhat less force-
fully than in his speech in Geneva, but the forum and the occa-
12. Id.
13. SeeJudith Miller, Crisis in the Balkans: United Nations; Annan Takes Critical Stance
on U.S. Actions in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at All.
14. Id.
15. Timor was, from a legal standpoint, different from Kosovo. The United Na-
tions never recognized Timor as a part of Indonesia. Consequently, the expected deci-
sion of the United Nations would not be seen as an intervention in internal affairs.
16. See Kofi Annan, Presentation of Secretary-General's Annual Report to the U.N.
General Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999), reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136, GA/
9596 (Sept. 20, 1999) [hereinafter General Assembly Address].
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sion-a unique and special platform-prompted many avid sup-
porters of state sovereignty to react adversely. Mr. Annan en-
tered dangerous territory simply by underlining the importance
of the principle of humanitarian intervention.
The existence of borders, said Annan, cannot possibly guar-
antee to any government the freedom to torture or massacre its
population.' 7 "This developing international norm in favor of
intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter," 8
concluded Annan, "will no doubt continue to pose profound
challenges to the international community." 9
It did right away. As the French newspaper Le Monde wrote,
"la doctrine Annan . . .n6a laiss6 personne indifferent."20 Mr.
Annan received polite applause from Western states, and a clear
refusal from China, Russia, and several significant third world
players. Algeria, China, India, Mexico, and Russia rose-in one
way or another-to oppose his remarks.
Those who unequivocally stood against the "humanitarian
intervention" came from different regions and cultures. I have
selected excerpts from the speeches of four dignitaries-from
Algeria, China, Malaysia, and Mexico-as examples. H.E. Mr.
Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that
[t]he so-called "humanitarian intervention" in a sovereign
state with neither a mandate from the U.N. Security Council nor
prior consent of the country concerned will cause a greater
humanitarian catastrophe instead of resolving the problem. 2 1
Rosario Green, .the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, stated
that
[t]he Mexican Government ... firmly rejects the existence of
an alleged right to intervene, particularly when it is proclaimed
outside the framework of international law.22
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Afsan6 Bassir Pour & Frachon Alain, Le Droit D'Ingerence Contre le Principe de
Souverainete, LE MONDE, Oct. 21, 1999, at 5.
21. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of
China, Statement at the 54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1999)
(visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.undp.org/missions/china/unga.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafterJiaxuan Statement] (emphasis
added).
22. Rosario Green, Secretary of Foreign Relations for Mexico, Statement at the
54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 23, 1999) (visited on Nov. 23, 1999)
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Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the President of the Republic of Algeria,
stated that
[w]e remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our
sovereignty not only because sovereignty is our final defense
against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not
taking part in the decision-making process by the Security
Council nor in the monitoring of their implementation. 23
And lastly, Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia,
stated that
[t]he principle that prevailed in the third quarter of the 20th
century was that no one should interfere in the internal af-
fairs of a nation. That was the essence of independence. But
then, a President decided that his country had a right and
duty to oversee that human rights are not abused anywhere in
the world irrespective of borders and the independence of
nations. No one conferred this right on this crusading Presi-
dent.24
Considering the views of these dignitaries, and of other
Member States,25 we should conclude that when the two princi-
ples-sovereignty and humanitarian intervention-collide, the
action taken should receive legal support. In other words, the
right to intervene should be authorized or supported by the Se-
curity Council. Such a rule ensures that any action taken is in
harmony with the U.N. Charter, which is protected by the Con-
stitution of the International Community. Nations who sup-
ported the intervention in Kosovo argued that the action was
quite exceptional, but noted that they would have been much
<http://www.sre.gob.mx/communicados/prensa/dgcs/1999/Sep/Discursos/
i-version/D-343.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter
Green Statement] (emphasis added).
23. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Alge-
ria, Statement at the 54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999) (vis-
ited on Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.algeria-un.org> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
24. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Statement
at the 54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 29, 1999) (visited on Nov. 23,
1999) <http://www.smpke.jpm.my/pm/speeches.html> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). Prime Minister Mohamad's remarks, wherein he complained bit-
terly about Western attempts forcibly to impose their values on the rest of the world
overnight, received the most applause in the 54th Assembly. A similar rift between
North and South continues today concerning the prohibition of the death penalty.
25. The recent South Summit in Havana, Cuba on April 14, rejected "the so called
right to humanitarian intervention" in very clear terms.
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more at ease if the Security Council had provided legal cover for
the military operation. 6 On the other hand, those outraged by
the military action in Kosovo, who oppose the right of interven-
tion, might have seen their position weakened if the Security
Council approved the operation.27
Let me again look to Mr. Annan's speech, in which he states
that the Security Council must rise to the challenge. "The
choice must not be between Council unity and inaction in the
face of genocide-as in the case of Rwanda, on the one hand; or
Council division, and regional action, as in the case of Kosovo,
on the other."2 1
Consequently, the Security Council is necessary. We must be
wary, however, for as Mr. Annan said, the intervention in Kosovo
took place outside the United Nations because of divisions on
the matter between the Permanent Members of the Security
Council. 9 Many felt that the Secretary General had broken the
sacred taboo of sovereignty."0 On this historical occasion, how-
ever, Mr. Annan was, in fact, courageously exhorting the interna-
tional community to open its eyes and face its responsibilities.
And, truthfully speaking, when such matters relate to the use of
force, the international community means the Security Council.
This fact raises serious questions. For example, a split in the
Security Council-and the resulting gridlock created by the veto
power of the Permanent Members-places any international in-
tervention, no matter how apocalyptic the outrage being com-
mitted, in legal quicksand. Let us not forget that the prohibition
26. Abel Matutes, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Statement at the 54th Ses-
sion of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 21, 1999) (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://
www.spainun.org/eng/statements/54E.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal). Abel Matutes, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Kosovo was
an exceptional case where action was necessary to prevent the worse of two evils. Id.
Generally, such action should require the authorization of the Security Council. Id.
27. SeeJiaxuan Statement, supra note 21; see also Green Statement, supra note 22.
The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that NATO's Kosovo operation was an
intervention "with neither a mandate from the U.N. Security Council nor prior consent
of the country concerned." Jiaxuan Statement, supra. In addition, the Mexican Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs stated that her government "rejects the.... right to intervene,
particularly when it is proclaimed outside the framework of international law." Green
Statement, supra.
28. Hague Address, supra note 3.
29. Id.
30. Georgie Anne Geyer, Unachievable U.N. Theories, WAsH. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at
A17.
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against intervention is not absolute; the Security Council may au-
thorize it in certain situations. The exceptions to the prohibi-
tion against intervention are set out, in coercive form, in Article
42 of the U.N. Charter, which allows military intervention when
it is necessary "to maintain or restore international peace and
security.""' The Security Council has exercised this option dur-
ing upheavals in certain geographical regions, or when refugees
threaten to flow into neighboring countries.
Mr. Annan's tribulations stem from instances when Perma-
nent Members in the Security Council split. This occurred dur-
ing the Kosovo crisis, where the threat of a Russian veto loomed
over any U.N. mandate to act. Despite the obvious seriousness of
the matter in Kosovo, the split between Permanent Members in
the Security Council kept the United Nations from acting, which
in turn, led to NATO's intervention without the blessing of the
Security Council. 2
When the Security Council fails to act, due either to the
threat or the actual exercise of the veto power, the United Na-
tions appears to be wavering or passive. Consequently, the repu-
tation of the United Nations is damaged. Expanding the use of
the veto power in the foreseeable future tortures U.N. defend-
ers. A future of recurring vetoes by the "Great Ones"-China,
France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States-which
would represent a return to Cold War-like patterns, might not be
tolerated by long-term international public opinion. The ero-
sion of the foremost duty of the United Nations, or as Mr. Mayor
Zaragoza puts it, restricting the United Nations to the role of a
"humanitarian organization, completely bereft of funds," could
be the coup de grace for the United Nations.
At the end of 1999, the United Nations was indeed going
through a sensitive patch. The "gilded age," those years of splen-
dor following the Cold War, when the Great Ones in the Security
Council unanimously and harmoniously acted to oppose Iraq
during the Gulf War, are over. The Gulf War was a "textbook
case" for the United Nations for obvious reasons. It was a fla-
grant violation of international law in that it was an invasion of a
31. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, art. 42, 59 Stat. at 1043.
32. These days many things can be said about the possibility of Russia exercising its
veto power, and the real intentions of the different players in the Security Council. In
any case, throughout the corridors of the United Nations, the impression was that the
Russians would veto any resolution mandating U.N. military operations in Kosovo.
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nation for the express purpose of wiping it off the map. Also,
there was an easily identifiable aggressor and victim. Cynics will
add that Saddam Hussein's little adventure threatened the eco-
nomic interests of some of the Permanent Members, which may
have been true, but thanks to the post-Cold War honeymoon,
the Security Council brought the aggressor to his senses and re-
dressed the injustice in an unusually prompt manner. Such
promptness and self-reliance would have delighted many of
those who first conceived the United Nations in the 1940s.11 At
the beginning of the 1990s, once the two superpowers overcame
their animosity and suspicions, the United Nations acted in line
with the purpose for which it was created.3 4 The Permanent
Members overcame their grudges and cast aside their loyalty to
former "clients." International legality seemed to reign
supreme, and the world anticipated a happy ending.
This cooperative mood amongst the Great Ones may now
have vanished. In this first year of the twenty-first century, the
United Nations suffers from a loss of credibility and prestige and
a crisis of legitimacy that restrains its ability to solve conflicts
and, sometimes, implement its resolutions. The responsibility
for this crisis does not fall on the United Nations or Mr. Annan,
who is a realistic diplomat convinced of U.N. potential. This cri-
sis is fundamentally and primarily on the Member States, espe-
cially the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, who
are capable of blocking the U.N. mechanism.
If a poll were conducted, among the Ambassadors who rep-
resent the 188 Member States of the United Nations, on the root
33. Never in the history of the United Nations has an aggression been so swiftly
condemned. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
660 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution 660]; see also S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution 678]. The first Se-
curity Council resolution on the matter, Resolution 660, was passed on August 2, 1990,
at 6:00 a.m., 12 hours after the beginning of the Iraqi invasion, with 14 votes, including
Cuba, in favor and only Yemen abstaining. Resolution 660, supra. Resolution 678,
which authorized the military intervention, was approved on November 29, 1990 with
12 votes in favor, two against, Yemen and Cuba, and China abstaining. Resolution 678,
supra.
34. See Bill Keller, Moscow Joins U.S. in Criticizing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at
A6. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was in the Soviet Union on an official visit on
the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Id. In a joint statement with his counterpart,
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevarnadze, one could read that "the governments
that set out on flagrant aggression must be aware that the international community will
not accept aggression." Id. It was a historic change.
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causes of the crisis and the decline in the prestige of the United
Nations, many then would point to two issues. The first is the
detached attitude of the United States. The second is the consti-
tutional imbalance in the United Nations, demonstrated primar-
ily by the excessive power of the Security Council and its five
Permanent Members.
I. THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES
For well-known reasons, the United Nations-let us use a
diplomatic term-"is not in fashion" among large segments of
the U.S. establishment, especially with those who make up the
circles of power in Washington. The attitude displayed by this
group of personalities goes from outright hostility" to impartial-
ity or indifference verging on open mistrust. Such detachment
can be perceived, inter alia, in what follows.
A. The Arrears
The United States, by far the worst financial delinquent in
the United Nations, does not pay its assessed contributions in a
timely manner. This is not a trivial matter given that the U.S.
debt amounts to US$1.675 billion as of October 1999,36 and the
35. U.N. "bashing" is a popular sport in U.S. political circles. Lewis Dolinsky, Wide-
Ranging Interview with Kofi Annan on S.F. Visit, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1998, at A8; Senator
Jesse Helms, Saving the U.N.: A Challenge to the Next Secretary Genera FOREIGN A".,
Sept./Oct. 1996, at 2; Holbrooke's Headache, FOREIGN REP., Nov. 11, 1999, available in
1999 WL 8943501. "Kofi Annan should be horse-whipped," remarked New York Con-
gressman Gerald Solomon after the Secretary General's returned from his much-
praised trip to Iraq. Dolinsky, supra. On the other hand, all-powerful Senator Jesse
Helms, in his demand for U.N. reform, wrote, "I was asked by a reporter whether the
United States should withdraw from the United Nations. It was a valid question, to
which I responded, 'not yet.'" Helms, supra. Pat Buchanan started his most recent
presidential campaign by lambasting the United Nations with quite a surprising state-
ment. After falsely accusing the Secretary General of threatening to withdraw U.S. vot-
ing rights in General Assembly, Buchanan stated, "I would give Mr. Kofi this word of
advice... [i]f our vote in the U.N. is in jeopardy, your lease on Turtle Bay is in jeop-
ardy." Holbrooke's Headache, supra. This statement was both amazing and amusing. See
U.N. Charter, supra note 4, art. 19, 59 Stat. at 1040. Firstly, Kofi Annan cannot suspend
the right to vote of any country. U.N. Charter, supra note 4. Article 19 of the U.N.
Charter declares that Member States automatically lose their right to vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly when they fall two years behind in their contributions to the U.N. budget.
Id. Secondly, the site of the U.N. Headquarters is leased, the United Nations owns the
land. Holbrooke's Headache, supra.
36. Barbara Borst, U.S. Lag on U.N. Dues Irks Other Nations Debt Exceeds World Body's
Budget, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 1999, at A26.
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annual budget of the United Nations is US$1.26 billion.37 These
figures are tantamount to stating that the U.S. arrears placed the
United Nations on the verge of outright bankruptcy.38
The financial non-compliance of the United States defies all
comprehension. Assessments for contributions to the U.N.
budgets are made according to each Member State's capacity to
pay, which is calculated according to its share in world Gross Na-
tional Product ("GNP"). Consequently, the United States is sup-
posed to contribute 25% of the regular budget,3 Japan 19.65%,
Germany 9.85%, Italy 5.4%, Spain 2.6%, and so on, each nation
according to its capacity to pay.4" With their refusal, the United
States is violating a principle honored by most of the Member
States, namely that payments should be made "in full, on time
and without conditions."41 I should hasten to say, adding insult
to injury, that the United Nations has already fulfilled quite a
few conditions in hopes of convincing the United States to pay
its arrears.
We have indeed done our homework, brushed our teeth,
and said our prayers. The United States disliked the former Sec-
retary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The United Nations,
37. Id.
38. Christopher S. Wren, International Symbol of Neglect; U.N. Building, Unimproved in
50 Years, Shows Its Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at A35. Even the decay of the building
itself is quite alarming: "[ilf the United Nations had to abide by city building regula-
tions... it might well be shuttered." Id.
39. Borst, supra note 36.
40. The principle of the capacity to pay seems laughable to some U.S. politicians.
See Calvin Woodward, Exaggerations Explode at Republican Debate, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Oct. 29, 1999, at A6. Former U.S. envoy to the United Nations, Alan Keyes, stated in
late October that the United Nations "takes our money, tosses it down the rat hole of
United Nations waste, reaches into the pockets of the working people of this country in
order to put our money into the pockets of the rich in developing countries." Id. Apart
from the poor idea that Mr. Keyes seems to have about the way the United Nations
manages its resources, his latter assertion is quite arrogant and egocentric. The United
States is the main single contributor to the United Nations, but it is not the only one.
See also Borst, supra note 36 (discussing dues of U.N. Member States). What about the
money of the working people of the European Union, who contribute 36.58% of the
U.N. budget? Borst, supra. What about tiny San Marino, whose inhabitants contribute
US$4.26 per citizen to the United Nations, in comparison to the United States, which
contributes only US$1.11 per citizen? In addition, the United States actually enjoys a
reduction in its assessments due to the 25% assessment ceiling. Id. Consequently, the
United States does not contribute its real percentage of world Gross National Product
("GNP"), which would total close to 29% of the U.N. budget. Id.
41. See New U.S., U.N. Relationship Seen, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 17, 1999, available in
1999 WL 28140359 (noting belief of many U.N. ambassadors state that U.N. Charter
requires members to pay bills in this manner).
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therefore, chopped his head off. In addition, a new U.N. Under-
Secretary General for Management, Joseph E. Connor, a U.S. na-
tional, was appointed. That is it, we thought, now they will pay.
This did not occur.
The United Nations was streamlined by cutting 1000 jobs,42
and we have more or less openly embraced the principle of a
zero growth budget. 43 In addition, the United Nations "politely"
requested New Zealand, which, by the way, is one of the best
pupils in the United Nations, to step down and withdraw its can-
didacy for membership in the Advisory Committee On Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Questions ("ACABQ") in order to make
room for the biggest delinquent, the United States.4"
The whole situation is baffling-even humiliating-for
most Member States. Why should France, the fourth largest con-
tributor, be barred from imposing such requirements on the
United Nations prior to paying its dues? Why should Canada
pay its assessed contributions fully and promptly? Is it not dis-
trubing to see men of the stature and intelligence of Bill Rich-
ardson and Richard Holbrooke stating something like "my big-
gest job is to get the United States to pay our bills and our ar-
rears," or the fact that they have to go twice a week to
Washington D.C. to try and extract overdue payments. 45 Accord-
ing to the President of the International Court of Justice, Justice
Stephen M. Schwabel, a U.S. national, there is no question that the
United States is obliged to pay.46
The failure of the United States to pay its arrears is having
the gravest consequences, not only in the work of the United
Nations, but also in other nations as well. Since the United Na-
tions is owed well over US$1.758 billion-sixty-six percent of it
42. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Remarks at Press Conference at U.N.
Headquarters, (Mar. 17, 1999), reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6183.
43. See UN. Recalls 'Strings Attached' To Back Payment of US. Dues, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Nov. 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25144303, at *1 (noting that U.S. conditions
payment of arrears on U.N. adoption of zero-growth budget). How many years can an
organization work efficiently with a zero growth budget?
44. See id. (noting that United States requires seat on U.N. Advisory Committee On
Administrative and Budgetary Question ("ACABQ") before paying arrears).
45. See A Losing Game at the U.N., BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1999, at A26 (noting
efforts of U.S, Ambassador to United Nations Richard Holbrooke to persuade Congress
to pay U.S. arrears).
46. UN. World Court President Says US. Must Pay Dues, NEws & OBSERVER, RALEIGH,
N.C., Oct. 31, 1999, at A12 (emphasis added).
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by the United States-and has to keep functioning, it borrows
money from the peace keeping operations budget. This means,
according to Mr. Annan, "that we cannot meet our. obligations to
member states that volunteer personnel and equipment for
peacekeeping operations."4 7 In other words, Bolivia, Morocco,
and Pakistan are not getting reimbursed for expenses because
the United States-federal budget surplus notwithstanding-is
in arrears.
B. The International Criminal Court and the Anti-Personnel
Mines Convention
The United States has not yet signed two paramount and
long awaited agreements, much cherished by world public opin-
ion. They are the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court48 and the U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction.49
C. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The vital Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty50 ("CTBT") was
sacrificed as a consequence of the tussle between the Clinton
Administration and the U.S. Congress.51 This immolation might
be due to either the new surge of isolationist feeling,5 2 or be-
47. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address to the Fifth Committee (Oct. 5, 1999),
reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7160 GA/AB/3311.
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
49. U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M.
1507.
50. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1439 (hereinafter CTBT].
51. See R. C. Longworth, Now That's Clout: How Chicago Is Shaping Foreign Policy,
CHI. TiB., Nov. 21, 1999, at 1 (noting that rejection of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
("CTBT") by U.S. Congress was based more on Republican majority's opposition to
President Clinton than on merits of CTBT).
52. Brian Urquhart, Looking for the Sheriff, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs,July 16, 1998, 47-48.
Without harkening back to the non-participation of the United States in the League of
Nations, during the drafting of the U.N. Charter in 1945, U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt knew congressional misgivings-concerning the power of the Security Coun-
cil to send U.S. troops to fight in the name of world peace-could only be overcome by
providing the United States with the veto power in the Security Council. Id. at 47.
According to Brian Urquhart, it is well known that Roosevelt almost lost the endorse-
ment of the New York Times during the 1944 Presidential campaign because of his
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cause of a sort of unilateralism that leads some U.S. politicians to
believe that U.S. economic wealth and military muscle render
international agreements futile and that the United States can
go it alone. In any case, the fact that no agreement was possible
between President Clinton and the U.S. Congress enraged many
overseas. The United States lost all influence as an advocate for
the CTBT, and the ratification process will most likely slow
down. According to Mr. Clinton, the world is now, undoubtedly,
a more dangerous place.
The reasons for the U.S. detachment are numerous, and
although some-though not the utterly shameful delinquency
on assessed contributions-may be justifiable, the bottom line is
that the United States is, by its actions, setting a devastating ex-
ample. The wealthiest nation in the world has chosen not to
honor its dues to the organization that it helped create, and of
which it is the most important member, and said dues have be-
come a bone of contention between the Clinton Administration
and the U.S. Congress. The leader of the free world went over a
year without appointing an ambassador to the body entrusted
with the task of securing and upholding international peace. In
addition, many efforts by the Secretary General to mediate con-
flicts have been greeted with reservations and even suspicion.
The United States does not even sign or ratify treaties whose pro-
priety is acknowledged unanimously by the international com-
munity. There is also the aforementioned contradiction in U.S.
behavior. Washington votes in favor of U.N. Missions in East Ti-
mor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, then withholds payment of the
funds that make them possible. All these actions harm the
United Nations beyond description, not only because the United
States is one of the world's foremost democratic states, but also
because of the U.S. standing as the sole superpower. The imme-
diate effect thereof is both contagious and harmful. Foreign af-
fairs is not the main concern of today's average U.S. citizen, and
certainly not of much concern to many in the political class in
this nation. We can only hope that this surge in U.S. unilateral-
53ism will only be temporary.
insistence that the future United Nations hold real power. Id. at 48. Moreover,
Roosevelt insisted that the San Francisco Conference get under way before the end of
the war out of fear that peace might rekindle isolationist feelings in the United States.
Id.
53. The trip to New York by Senator Jesse Helms, with his highly debatable inter-
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II. INSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCES
The institutional imbalance that exists in the United Na-
tions is a structural matter and, as such, is very serious. The divi-
sion of power in the United Nations is quite odd and immedi-
ately astonishes anyone who comes in contact with it for the first
time. The imbalance between the two most important bodies,
the General Assembly and the Security Council, is weighted
heavily in favor of the latter. The distribution of responsibilities
laid down in the U.N. Charter clearly creates a democratic defi-
cit that turns the United Nations into an international govern-
ment of the Great Ones. As Morgenthau puts it, "its distribution
of responsibilities is a constitutional monstrosity."
While the General Assembly-where all Member States are
represented equally-can pass resolutions that are mere recom-
mendations, the Security Council, under Article 25 of the U.N.
Charter, makes binding decisions for Member States. 54 The Se-
curity Council decides when force will be used in the event of an
international crisis, 55 yet the democratic credentials of the Secur-
ity Council remain dubious considering that the five Permanent
Members with veto powers do not stand for election.
Therefore, it is not surprising that from the outset of the
United Nations, the Security Council has been subject to attack
and criticism as anachronistic and undemocratic. Is it under-
standable or acceptable that the five Permanent Members con-
tinue to enjoy exorbitant prerogatives for having won a war that
ended more that a half a century ago? Should this fact make
them "Permanent?" As Robert Fowler, Canadian Ambassador at
the United Nations, sarcastically states, "permanence is a very
long, long time."
The five Permanent Members make up the Board of Direc-
tors. The difference in power between those five and the other
183 Member States of the United Nations is a democratic anom-
aly. It is this anomaly that made the experienced Spanish Am-
bassador Jaime de Pini~s, former President of the General As-
pretation of international obligations, and the subsequent almost unprecedented "pil-
grimage" of the Security Council to Washington, D.C., have cleared the air a bit but the
problems and suspicions remain.
54. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, art. 25, 59 Stat. at 1041.
55. According to George Schwarzenberger, "The Security Council is the main cus-
todian of world peace. Its discretionary faculty to determine what constitutes a threat to
peace or an aggression is unlimited."
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sembly, state that the United Nations has "violated its own texts
from start" by creating a split among Permanent and non-perma-
nent Members which, in itself, violated the "principle of sover-
eign equality [for] all .. .Members."56
The often criticized inequality that irritates numerous critics
of the current Security Council does not originate from the per-
manent status of the five aristocrats alone, but from another
quality that makes them untouchable, almost divine, their pos-
session of the veto power,57 which is the mother of all powers of the
United Nations. Although nations like the United States, who
"pulled the strings" at the end of World War II, took into ac-
count their own internal political motivations when framing the
veto power, the ultimate reasons for introducing it was to consol-
idate the post-war balance of power in order to avoid a possible
clash between the victors of World War II. "The first and fore-
most goal of the United Nations was to spare the world the fear
of another great war. Any other objectives were conceived as
mere accessories to the former."58
Let us pause for a moment and examine the origins of this
fascinating tool of power in international politics. The veto
question was cooked up long before San Francisco, namely in
the October 1944 Dumbarton Oaks and January 1945 Yalta Con-
ferences. The first three Great Ones, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics ("Soviet Union" or "U.S.S.R."), United Kingdom,
and United States, were the master chefs.59 Chiang-Kai-shek's
China was kept waiting in the chambers next door during delib-
erations at Dumbarton Oaks because the Soviet Union did not
want China at the negotiating table. In addition, France was not
yet a participating member.
The deal was not closed at Dumbarton Oaks. The three
powers agreed that the veto power was of capital importance, but
for Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, the veto power had to
be absolute. It was to be used not only to stop passage of any
56. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, art. 2(1), 59 Stat. at 1037.
57. Id. art. 27(3), 59 Stat. at 1041.
58. This was said by George Schwarzenberger.
59. The Philippine Carlos P. Romulo, signer of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco
and one of the longest serving Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the last 50 years, wrote in
his memoirs: "none of the members of the Assembly had the slightest idea that the
goose was cooked at Yalta and there was no other recourse than to accept it." CARLos P.
ROMULO, FORTY YEARs: A THIRD WORLD SOLDIER AT THE U.N. 15 (1986).
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resolution, but also to prevent the mere discussion of any issue
as well. The United States and Great Britain, a tad more demo-
cratic, were ready to accept a plan in which the Great Ones
could not go so far as to veto discussions completely. At Yalta,
the Soviet Union yielded, accepting President Roosevelt's propo-
sal that the Great Ones could hold veto power on all substan-
tive-but not procedural-issues. Any Permanent Member of
the Security Council, who was a party to a conflict, would be ex-
pected to abstain from voting, but that nation could still veto any
resolution on the matter. President Roosevelt paid a price for
the Soviet Union's acceptance of this nuance as Byelorus, Russia,
and the Ukraine were all given votes in the General Assembly.
The Soviet Union's obsession with an all-encompassing veto
is dealt with by Winston Churchill in his Memoires of World War
11.60 He states that Joseph Stalin appeared deeply affected by
events during the Russo-Finnish war of December 1939. Stalin
argued that "the British and the French used the League of Na-
tions against us and succeeded in isolating and expelling the So-
viet Union from the League, and when they later mobilized
against us and talked of a crusade against Russia. Cannot we
have some guarantees that this sort of thing will not happen
again?"6' The great Churchill thus concludes his reflections on
Yalta, stating that
after much striving and explanation, we persuaded him to ac-
cept an American scheme whereby the Security Council
would be virtually powerless unless the 'Big Four' were unani-
mous. If the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain or China dis-
agreed on any major topic, then anyone of them could refuse
their assent and stop the Council doing anything. Here was
the Veto. Posterity may judge the results."62
The paragraph speaks volumes about the power vested in the
highly-privileged five Great Ones, and, to a certain extent, about
the origin of the recurring gridlock in the United Nations.
The veto dish, prepared and seasoned by the first three
Great Ones before the obliging gaze of China, was not graciously
accepted by all those attending the San Francisco Conference,
60. WINSTON CHURCHILL, MEMOIRES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 916 (abridged
ed. 1959); see HERBERT FEIss, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED
AND THE PEACE THEY SOUGHT 550-58 (1957).
61. CHURCHILL, supra note 60, at 916.
62. Id.
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which, fifty-four years ago, gave birth to the United Nations. Sev-
eral of the fifty nations attending the San Francisco Conference
anxiously pawed the ground, noticing that the veto-as it was
molded by the first three Great Ones-instituted a privileged ar-
istocracy, a five-country committee6" permanently directing the
organization. Several nations tried to make the veto feasible by
scaling it back slightly. Australia suggested that it should be lim-
ited to actions contemplated in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
on "Action [s] with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."64 Even France, before
anointing herself upon the Great Ones' mantle, proposed some-
thing similar in March 1945.65 The Australian proposal was ulti-
mately rejected.
ThroughoutJune andJuly 1945, nations participating in the
San Francisco Convention gradually came to the conclusion that
the veto issue was simply a take it or leave it matter. As Carlos P.
Romulo states, "Stettinius told Evatt-the Australian Foreign
Minister-and me that without the veto the United States would
not be a Member of the United Nations."66 The present Mexi-
can Ambassador to the United Nations, Manuel Tello, has also
written on the subject. "We were told, plainly and without
doubt, that either the veto was granted or there would be no
United Nations. The participants' desire to rely on an Organiza-
tion that would save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, as stated in the Charter, prevailed." In the words of another
author,
Senator Connally, member of the United States delegation,
told the other delegates: 'You may go home from San Fran-
cisco, if you wish, and report that you have defeated the veto.'
... But you can also say, 'We tore up the Charter.' Where-
upon the senator picked up his copy of a draft of the charter,
tore it into shreds, and flung the scraps upon the negotiating
table. The histrionic threat that the choice lay between a
strong veto and no U.N. at all carried the day.
67
63. Due to Churchill's insistence, France eventually gained Permanent Member
status in the Security Council.
64. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, ch. VII, arts. 39-51, 59 Stat. at 1043-45.
65. Once canonized with Permanent Member status in the Security Council,
France, either joyfully or resignedly, accepted the Great One's veto formula.
66. ROMULO, supra note 59, at 16.
67. STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST Fivr YEAs 19 (1995).
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On June 13, 1945 the veto issue, the dictat of the Great Ones,
was approved by the Conference.68 The famous dictum of
Cervantes, "there are but two families in the world... the Haves
and the Havenots"69 was reenacted and coined for eternity. We
can see that at the birth of the United Nations, the Great Ones
were awarded a total veto on relevant matters.
The possession of the veto power is not a trifling issue. The
affirmative vote, or at least the absence of a negative vote, by the
five Permanent Members, carries weight in various aspects of
U.N. functions. The consent of the Great Ones is essential for
the admission of new Members,7" the suspension or expulsion of
Members," the appointment of the Secretary General,' 2 and de-
cisions on all other substantial matters.
73
Several of these prerogatives seem ludicrous. The fact that
the United States can, against the wishes of all the other Member
States of the United Nations, block the reelection of former Sec-
retary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is surprising. The fact that
the Soviet Union exercised the veto on fifty occasions to hinder
the admission of several states like Austria, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain is absurd.'" Both, however, are realities, stamped in the
U.N. Charter and totally in force today.' 5
68. The voting record of the paragraph containing the veto idea was as follows.
In favor 30: Brazil, Byelorus, Canada, China, Czech and Slovak Republic, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, India, Iraq, Leba-
non, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tur-
key, Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugo-
slavia.
Against 2: Colombia and Cuba (pre-Castro).
Abstentions 15: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.
Absent 3: Ecuador, Haiti, and Saudi Arabia.
69. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA Pt. II, ch. 20, at 709
(Charles Jarvis trans., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1999) (1605-15).
70. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, art. 4(2), 59 Stat. at 1038.
71. Id. arts. 5, 6, 59 Stat. at 1038.
72. Id. art. 97, 59 Stat. at 1052.
73. Id. art. 27, 59 Stat. at 1044 (emphasis added).
74. The United States used the veto in this manner on 20 occasions.
75. Overall, the Soviet Union or Russia has used the veto on 126 occasions, 124
times by the Soviet Union, and twice by Russia. The United States has exercised the
veto 84 times, the United Kingdom 33 times, China 24 times, and France 18 times. The
French vetoes were mostly related to its colonial past in Indochina, the Suez, and
Bizerta.
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III. THE PENDING UPDATING
A. Examples of the Situation
The abusive exercise of the veto power certainly erodes the
legitimacy of the United Nations, especially when the mere
threat of a veto effectively brings the United Nations to a stand-
still. Let us examine two recent examples. Earlier this year, the
Republic of Macedonia severed diplomatic ties with the People's
Republic of China and established ties with Taiwan. Beijing's
anger was understandable, but its reaction, casting a veto on the
extension of the deployment of the U.N. Preventative Deploy-
ment Force ("UNPREDEP") in Macedonia was incorrigible.76
Was a great power serving the cause of world peace in this case?
Was not China attempting to get even with Macedonia at the
expense of the United Nations and the stability in the Balkans?
The case in Kosovo has a potentially larger legal and polit-
ical impact. In late March 1999, when Milosevic walked away
from the Rambouillet Agreement, which was completed with the
participation of Russia, the international community felt com-
pelled to take action to avoid a new shameful episode of ethnic
cleansing as seen in Bosnia. The Security Council should have
provided legal cover for the intervention, but the threat of a Rus-
sian veto loomed large in the halls of U.N. Headquarters. Most
believed at the time that Russia, or even China, would cast a veto
vote. To avoid that foreseeable impasse, NATO had to step in
unilaterally. The prevailing desire among the majority of Mem-
ber States at that time was not to let Milosevic's behavior go un-
punished. The crushing defeat of the Russian-sponsored resolu-
tion is a telling example of said attitude.77
The issue is that one government, the Russian or Chinese in
the case of Kosovo, or the United States in other instances, can
bring to a crashing halt the elaborate machinery designed to up-
hold and defend world peace and punish aggressors. The will of
76. Security Council Fails To Extend Mandate of United Nations Preventative Deployment
Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N. Press Release SC/6648 (Feb. 25,
1999).
77. Security Council Rejects Demand For Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999). The Security Council reso-
lution in question would have condemned NATO and demanded an immediate cessa-
tion of the military operation against Yugoslavia. Id. Twelve members of the Security
Council voted against resolution. Id. Only three, China, Nambia, and Russia, voted in
favor of it. Id.
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one Member State, against that of the remaining 187, may result
in an international operation occurring outside the legal frame-
work of the U.N. Charter. All this is based on the outcome of a
war that ended fifty-four years ago.
An update of the United Nations, which substantially miti-
gates its institutional imbalance and redresses the not-always-en-
lightened despotism, is, unfortunately, not plausible today. The
United Nations, however, does need to revitalize the General As-
sembly and make the Security Council a more representative
body. This can be accomplished by enlarging the Security Coun-
cil,78 and by limiting, if not eliminating, the use of veto by the
Permanent Members.
Proposals to "democratize" the veto, i.e., curtail its omnipo-
tent nature, are countless. The most revolutionary would be to
eliminate it. One could apply the principles of copyright legisla-
tion to the veto. The victors of World War II concocted the veto,
and they patented it at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.
What is the time limit that international law grants to the au-
thors of any literary creation before it enters the realm of public
property, sixty-five years, seventy-five years? According to this es-
timate, even if we began counting after the death of the veto's
last creator, Winston Churchill, the exclusive right of the Perma-
nent Members to the veto should disappear in 2010 or 2030. At
that time we could consider the issue again. What nations, due
to their level of influence, will have the right to control the
power structure of the United Nations in the second decade of
the twenty-first century? What will the balance of power in the
international arena look like in 2010 or 2030? In this respect, I
was just kidding. Before the current veto masters blow me up, I
78. The issue of poor representation is another complaint aimed at the Security
Council. In 1945, 11 states made up the Security Council, out of a total of 50 U.N.
Member States. In 1999, the Security Council has 15 members, out of a total of 188
U.N. Member States, and of these 15, five are Permanent Members with a veto, and 10
are elected without veto. The Security Council should be enlarged so that many more
nations have a seat at the heavenly table. So far, almost everybody agrees. A Pandora's
Box opens, however, when one intimates the possibility of creating new permanent
seats. Obviously, people will kill for them. Who would be entitled to sit with the aristoc-
racy? The wealthiest? Why? The nuclear nations? Why? Those with the heaviest popu-
lations? Why? The most industrious members of the United Nations? By which stan-
dards? And above all, the million-dollar question, who wants to create a new privilege?
Who wants to grant a new member the power to paralyze the international community,
and the United Nations, in order to defend their strict national interest, or that of their
friends or clients, or just because of a tantrum?
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will consider other possibilities to alleviate their all-powerful sta-
tus.
B. Possible Solutions
The first solution has already been devised. It is the U.N.
"Uniting For Peace" Resolution,7" adopted at the outset of the
Korean peninsula conflict in 1950. Under this plan, if the Secur-
ity Council is faced with a serious situation, but is paralyzed be-
cause of the position of one Permanent Member, then the ques-
tion of whether to take action can be rerouted to the General
Assembly, which may adopt a resolution by a highly qualified ma-
jority.8 0
Another possible solution is to allow the Security Council
itself to override the veto of one member. A 4/5 majority of
Security Council Permanent Members can declare void the
blocking veto of one Permanent Member. Several personalities
are advancing this possibility, including Mr. Annan. A variant of
this idea is to have the Security Council take the issue at hand for
"second consideration," if it was once paralyzed by a Permanent
Member's veto. During this second round, the Security Council
will desist only if two Permanent Members exercise their veto
power.
A third solution is for the Permanent Members to declare a
moratorium on the use of the veto. It is a provisional solution in
that it puts off-but does not definitively solve-the problem.
The advantage is that it does not imply a reformation of the U.N.
Charter. Honestly though, could we expect the Permanent
Members to agree to that? Lastly, the most conservative solu-
tion, which has been proposed by the German Minister of For-
eign Affairs, is to compel the vetoing delegation to explain their
decision.8"
These alternatives, which are geared toward making the
aristocratic veto more palatable, are within the reach of anyone's
imagination. Nonetheless, the chances for substantial reform
are literally nil. The mere thought that the Permanent Members
79. G.A. Res. 337(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950).
80. Id.
81. Joschka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Statement at the 54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1999)
(visited Nov. 25, 1999) <http://www.germany-info.org/UN/un-state_09_22_99.htm>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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could seriously debate the above-mentioned formulae is utterly
naive. "Lasciata fora ogni speranza," to those who come on U.N.
property. Paraphrasing U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, we
could say that the Permanent Members disagree all the time on
many things; disagree sometimes on some things; but agree all the
time on a single thing, the veto. Do not touch it.8 2
A revealing study by the Ford Foundation and Yale Univer-
sity highlights the heart of the matter. Upon expressing dissatis-
faction with the United Nations, most overlook that the United
Nations "can only be as effective as governments allow it to be."8 3
Uncommonly true. In his previously noted speech in The
Hague, the Secretary General acknowledged-more or less-the
same notion.8 4 When addressing the five Permanent Members
of the Security Council, Mr. Annan pointed out that "the Secur-
ity Council [must] unite around the aim of confronting massive
human rights violations and crimes against humanity on the
scale of Kosovo."8" In both Rwanda and Kosovo, the Security
Council must "find unity in defense of our common human-
ity."" This diplomatic criticism of the rift between the Great
Ones by the Secretary General, and the evil effects of the veto
power, carries the weight of a premonition.
Will the lack of unity in the Security Council and the blessed
veto make the United Nations, "ce machin-lt" in De Gaulle's
words, a humanitarian ornament? Will the Security Council end
up, out of sheer "veto heartburn," passing its trappings out to
any given G-8 and killing the United Nations? The United Na-
tions or the world at large must urgently reassess the concept of
humanitarian intervention. Should the international commu-
nity resign itself to remaining passive when confronted with a
blatant atrocity in the twenty-first century because of the scrupu-
lous respect for the principle of sovereignty or the use of veto by
one nation? It is a terrible dilemma. "So attention must be
paid."
82. Needless to say, the Permanent Members can stop anything. See U.N. Charter,
supra note 4, art. 108, 59 Stat. at 1053 (predicating amendments to U.N. Charter on
approval of all Permanent Members of Security Council). They have the veto over the
veto. I am not making this up.
83. THE INDEPENDENT WORKING GROUP OF THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY 5 (1995).
84. Hague Address, supra note 3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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